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Banks’ responses to funding liquidity shocks:  





The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has shown that if wholesale funding dries up, banks face huge 
funding liquidity problems.9 The freeze of wholesale funding markets was an essential characteristic 
of the crisis (IMF, 2010b). In particular, the part of wholesale funding that is linked to asset markets, 
i.e. repo funding, issuance of securities and asset-backed finance, was hit hard. This activated the 
liquidity channel of financial transmission through which funding liquidity shocks are propagated to 
bank lending and the real economy (BCBS, 2011). Evidence on the role of financial markets in the 
liquidity channel remains scarce. This chapter contributes to fill this gap by analysing empirically how 
banks adjust to a funding liquidity shock originating from financial market volatility, using data on 
Dutch banks during the financial crisis. 
We focus on three types of adjustment on the asset side of the bank balance sheet: (1) reduced 
lending, (2) liquidity hoarding, and (3) fire sales. Figure 3.1 shows a stylized bank balance sheet 
illustrating these three types of responses. If a bank is confronted with a negative shock in wholesale 
funding (depicted by a downward pointing arrow), it has the following options. First, it can cut down 
lending, either retail or wholesale. Second, it can sell securities from its investment portfolio, which is 
known as ‘fire sales’ if the bank is under pressure to do so. Third, it can borrow from the central bank 
(thus bringing down its net claims position). If the bank fears that its future access to liquidity is 
uncertain, it may even borrow extra from the central bank and hold these funds as a buffer in deposit at 
the central bank. Liquidity buffers could also be strengthened by holding more highly liquid bonds. 
These two precautionary saving measures can be classified as ‘liquidity hoarding’ (denoted by the 
arrows within parentheses in Figure 3.1). 
 
                                               
9
 This chapter is a revised version of De Haan and Van den End (2011). 
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Figure 3.1. Stylized bank balance sheet: Possible asset side responses  
Net claims on Central Bank ↓(↑) Retail deposits   
Retail credit ↓ Wholesale borrowing  ↓ 
Wholesale credit ↓ Capital  
Securities holdings ↓   
- of which: Liquid securities holdings (↑)   
Note: A downward (upward) pointing arrow denotes a decrease (increase). 
 
 
Aspects of the above mentioned three behavioural responses to funding liquidity shocks have been 
addressed in the recent literature, both empirically and theoretically. Theoretically, Diamond and 
Rajan (2005) stress the interaction and reinforcing effects of banks’ liquidity shortages and solvency 
problems. They explain how aggregate liquidity shortages can emerge and force banks to prematurely 
foreclose otherwise profitable loans, which can result in banks facing sizable losses that will restrain 
future lending. Empirically, the response of bank lending to funding shocks has been examined mostly 
by means of single equation models. For example, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that a greater 
volatility of deposits and draws on committed credit lines prompt banks to reduce lending. Cornett et 
al. (2010) find that US banks with more stable funding sources were better able to continue lending 
during the crisis. They also find that liquidity hoarding is mostly related to the proportion of illiquid 
assets and the presence of unused off-balance sheet loan commitments on the bank balance sheet. 
Acharya et al.’s (2008) theoretical study relates liquidity hoarding to so-called ‘predatory behaviour’, 
aimed at the exploitation of urgent funding needs of other market participants. They show that banks 
with surplus liquidity have an incentive to strategically underprovide liquidity to other banks, to be 
able to benefit from the latter’s forced fire sales of assets against low liquidation prices. Similarly, 
Diamond and Rajan (2009) show that the expectation of distressed banks being forced to sell assets in 
the future at fire-sale prices drives healthy banks to hoard liquid funds so as to allow them to take 
advantage of future investment opportunities. Fire sales as such are mostly captured in theoretical 
models (e.g. Cifuentes et al., 2005) or in simulation models of central banks (e.g. Aikman et al., 2009). 
These models consider both liquidity and capital constraints as triggers of fire sales, without 
specifying which constraint is the most binding.  
To the best of our knowledge, the link between fire sales on the one hand, and liquidity and 
capital constraints on the other, has not been examined empirically. Hence, another purpose of this 
chapter is to examine the effects of both liquidity and capital constraints on fire sales. For theorists as 
well as regulators, it is important to know the relative importance of the bank liquidity and bank 
capital channel as a driver of adjustments on the asset side of banks’ balance sheet. We employ a 
multi-equation framework instead of a single-equation framework, thus taking into account the 
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dynamic interrelations among instruments of bank liquidity management. To investigate bank liquidity 
management strategies in more detail, this chapter uses disaggregated balance sheet data. The multi-
equation approach has been used before. Spindt and Tarfan (1980), for example, model US banks’ 
liquid assets and liabilities as a system of equations. In their model, liabilities are qualified as (weakly) 
exogenous and assets as endogenous, based on the idea that banks can determine their investment and 
lending strategies, while the availability of funding is predominantly given. We adopt similar 
assumptions in this chapter. However, there are several differences between their and our approach. 
Spindt and Tarfan estimate separate models for five large US money-center banks and then average 
the coefficients. In contrast, we estimate a multi-equation model while pooling our sample of banks, so 
that the model represents the banks’ average behaviour. Further, we use a panel Vector Auto-
Regressive (p-VAR) model, which takes into account the heterogeneity between individual banks by 
allowing for fixed effects. An advantage of VAR models is that they can be used to generate 
orthogonalized impulse-response functions, identifying the impact of an isolated shock to one variable 
to all the other variables in the system.  
Our VAR model is estimated using monthly data of 17 of the largest Dutch banks over the 
period January 2004 to April 2010. This period encompasses the run-up to and subsequent unwinding 
of the financial crisis. We find that banks respond to an asset market driven funding shock in several 
ways. First, banks reduce lending, especially wholesale lending. Second, banks hoard liquidity, in the 
form of liquid bonds and central bank reserves. Third, banks conduct fire sales of securities, especially 
equity. Finally, our results suggest that fire sales are triggered by liquidity constraints rather than by 
solvency constraints.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model. Section 3.3 
describes the data and some stylized facts. Section 3.4 discusses the results. Section 3.5 presents 





We use a panel-VAR model, which treats all variables in the system as endogenous and allows for 
























         (3.1) 
 
where Xt is a vector containing one market funding cost variable for each month t and Yit is a vector 
holding a set of balance sheet variables for each bank i and month t. In Section 3.4 the variables which 
are included in the respective models are specified. Ai is a matrix of bank-specific fixed effects, B(L) is 
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a matrix polynomial in the lag operator whose order is 3 according to Akaike’s information criterion. 
itε is the error term. The coefficients of the p-VAR model are estimated by system Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM), using lags of the model variables as instruments.10 GMM is widely used 
in the absence of strictly exogenous variables or instruments, see for instance Doytch and Uctum 
(2011). System GMM has one set of instruments to deal with endogeneity of regressors and another 
set to deal with the correlation between lagged dependent variables and the error term. The fixed 
effects are eliminated by expressing all variables as deviation from their means. Since the fixed effects 
are correlated with the regressors as a result of the inclusion of lags of the dependent variables, 
ordinary mean-differencing (i.e. expressing all variables as deviations from their full sample period’s 
means) as commonly used to eliminate fixed effects would create biased coefficients. To avoid this 
problem, forward mean-differencing, also known as ‘Helmert’ transformation’, is used instead (cf. 
Arellano and Bover, 1995). This procedure removes only the forward mean, i.e. the mean of all future 
observations available in the sample and preserves the orthogonality between transformed variables 
and lagged regressors, so that the lagged regressors can be used as valid instruments for estimating the 
coefficients by system GMM.  
The model variables are chosen for their relevance with respect to our three behavioural 
hypotheses under consideration (see Appendix 3.1 for the definitions of the variables). On the liability 
side, we distinguish retail funding (RETDEP), secured wholesale funding by repurchase agreements 
(REPO) and securities funding (SECUR). Next to these balance sheet variables, we include a market 
funding cost variable, proxied by the spread on the money market swap rate (SPR). SPR is the cost of 
unsecured interbank funding and is usually considered to be an important determinant of banks’ 
deposit and lending rates. The model is used to simulate banks’ responses on the asset side of their 
balance sheets to shocks in the above mentioned funding variables. Thereby, three types of responses 
are considered: (1) bank lending, (2) liquidity hoarding and (3) fire sales.  
For bank lending, we consider two main categories, wholesale lending (WSCR) and retail 
lending (RETCR). Liquidity hoarding is captured by the asset side variables of highly liquid bonds 
(BONDL) and net claims on the Central Bank (NCCB). Both can act as liquidity buffer in times of 
stress. For fire sales, we consider investments in less liquid bonds (BONDI) and equity investments 
(EQ), under the assumption that under stressful market conditions banks prefer to sell their least liquid 
bonds (BONDI) first, while holding on to their highly liquid bonds (BONDL) for precautionary 
(liquidity hoarding) reasons.  
Two remarks should be made as to the scope of the model. First, the causality between market 
liquidity and funding liquidity is not explored in the paper. Our focus is on the causality running from 
funding liquidity to bank assets. Second, contagion effects between individual banks are not studied 
                                               
10
 For more details we refer to Love and Zicchino (2006), whose Stata code we gratefully used for the 
estimation. 
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explicitly in this paper. However, several of the model variables (for example, WSCR and REPO) 
partly measure how much a particular bank lends to c.q. borrows from all other banks. Hence, spill-
over effects are captured implicitly by the panel VAR model’s coefficient estimates.  
To examine banks’ responses to funding liquidity shocks, we use impulse-response functions 
that are derived from the p-VAR model. The shocks are orthogonalized, so that the response of one 
variable to a shock in another variable can be interpreted as the reaction of the former variable to the 
innovations in the latter, while holding all other shocks equal to zero. To orthogonalize the shocks it is 
necessary to decompose the residuals. The decomposition is conducted by imposing a particular 
ordering of the variables in the system and attributing any correlation between the residuals of any two 
elements to the variable that comes first in the ordering. This procedure is known as the Choleski 
decomposition. The identifying assumption is that variables that come earlier in the ordering affect the 
following variables contemporaneously, as well as with lags, while the variables that come later affect 
the previous variables only with lags. In other words, the variables that appear earlier in the ordering 
are more exogenous than the ones that appear later (or, more formally, in the short run the former are 
weakly exogenous with respect to the latter). We will perform robustness checks to test the sensitivity 
of the outcomes for changes in the ordering of the variables. 
For our model specifications, we generally adopt the following principles with respect to the 
ordering of the variables. First, we assume that shocks in the cost of wholesale funding have an 
immediate effect on the balance sheet variables and that the funding cost responds to the balance sheet 
shocks with a lag. Second, we assume that bank liabilities respond more quickly than bank assets. This 
assumption reflects the fact that funding depends on market conditions that are often outside the 
banks’ direct control, while banks’ asset management in principle is at their own discretion.11 Third, 
we assume that wholesale instruments (assets as well as liabilities) respond more quickly than retail 
items. This takes into account that wholesale instruments usually have shorter maturities than retail 
instruments and therefore can be more easily adjusted. Fourth, we assume that liquid balance sheet 
items with a short maturity adjust more quickly than less liquid and longer-term items.  
Since the impulse-response functions are constructed from the model’s estimated coefficients, 
the latter’s standard errors need to be taken into account. We calculate the standard errors and generate 
confidence intervals of the impulse response functions using Monte Carlo simulations. This is 
conducted by taking random draws of the model’s coefficients, using the estimated coefficients and 
their variance–covariance matrix. We take 1,000 draws. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the resulting 
distribution are used for the 90% confidence intervals of the impulse-responses. 
                                               
11




3.3 Data and stylized facts 
 
We use monthly data on liquid assets and liabilities of Dutch banks over the period January 2004 to 
April 2010. This period encompasses both the pre-crisis and the crisis period. Our variables of interest 
are summed up and defined in Appendix 3.1. All balance sheet variables are scaled by total assets. The 
forward mean-differencing transformation contributes to the stationarity of the model variables. Panel 
unit root tests indicate that all series are stationary.12 The variables for securities holdings (BONDL, 
BONDI and EQ) have been deflated by a relevant market price index13, since we are interested in 
deliberate portfolio adjustments net of revaluation effects.  
The data source of the bank variables is De Nederlandsche Bank’s (DNB) prudential liquidity 
report (DNB, 2003). This unique data source contains end-of-month data on liquid assets and 
liabilities for all Dutch banks (including branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks) under 
supervision, with a detailed break-down per balance sheet item. Not every item is reported by all 
banks, since small banks do not have exposures in all categories. For that reason we use data of 17 
banks whose average size during the sample period, measured by total assets, falls above the 80th 
percentile of the full sample’s distribution.14 We also use a sub-sample of the 5 largest banks. These 
top-5 banks (ING, ABN-Amro, Rabobank, SNS and Fortis-Netherlands, until its merger with ABN-
Amro mid-2010) represent around 85% of total assets in the sector. The 17 institutions consist of the 
top-5 banks, 9 smaller domestic banks and 3 subsidiaries of foreign banks, together accounting for 
around 95% of the sector.  
The asset side of the balance sheets is dominated by retail and wholesale loans (Table 3.1). On 
the liability side of the balance sheet, retail borrowing accounts for only a small portion (on average 
10% to 15%). This is due to the relatively limited retail savings market in the Netherlands, where 
banks have to compete with pension funds and insurers (DNB, 2010b). Our two samples mostly differ 
with regard to their reliance on asset market related wholesale funding. The largest 5 banks are more 
dependent on the repo market, with a share of secured wholesale borrowing (REPO) in total funding 
twice as high compared to the average of 17 banks. The smaller banks are relatively more dependent 
on the issuance of securities (bonds, commercial paper, certificates of deposits, including asset-back 
securities), as reflected in the average share of SECUR of 32.6% for the whole sample of 17 banks 
versus 22.0% for the top-5 banks.  
 
                                               
12
 The Levin, Liu and Chu t-test and the Fisher Chi-square-test, respectively, indicate that the null hypotheses of 
a common unit root process and individual unit root processes can be rejected. 
13
 BONDL and BONDI have been deflated by the FTSE EURO index of AAA rated corporate bonds. EQ has 
been deflated by the MSCI worldwide stock index. 
14
 The total number of banks under supervision at the end of March 2010 was 81. 
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics, January 2004 – April 2010 
  
All 17 banks 
  
Top-5 banks 
 ________________________  _________________________ 
 Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
 Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Assets        
NCCB 0.011 0.004 0.037  0.007 0.004 0.025 
BONDL 0.062 0.046 0.057  0.066 0.048 0.044 
BONDI 0.063 0.016 0.089  0.077 0.082 0.061 
EQ 0.010 0.000 0.018  0.441 0.356 0.224 
RETCR 0.492 0.549 0.299  0.441 0.356 0.224 
WSCR 0.328 0.234 0.286  0.341 0.340 0.200 
        
Liabilities        
SECUR 0.326 0.233 0.292  0.220 0.164 0.158 
REPO 0.111 0.000 0.196  0.225 0.225 0.166 
RETDEP 0.106 0.049 0.126  0.154 0.153 0.089 
        
Capital        
TIER1 0.192 0.139 0.197  0.129 0.102 0.060 
        
Financial market        
SPR 31.2 6.3 38.2  31.2 6.3 38.2 
CDS 54.2 16.2 60.7  54.2 16.2 60.7 
Note: Variable definitions are given in Appendix 3.1. 
 
 
Before estimating the model, we first describe some stylized facts for our selected model variables. 
The money market spread clearly depicts the pre-crisis period with a constant and low spread, and the 
crisis-period beginning in August 2007 with a surging spread. This reflects the drying up of the 
unsecured interbank market15 (Figure 3.2, panel E). The reliance on secured wholesale funding by 
Dutch banks varied substantially between these two periods. In the years before the crisis, the use of 
secured wholesale funding relative to retail funding almost doubled (Figure 3.2, panel A). The benign 
market conditions and the development of new financial instruments (such as asset-backed securities) 
                                               
15
 Unsecured wholesale funding is captured by the cost variable SPR in the model. Unsecured wholesale funding 
itself is not among our model variables (therefore not shown in the figure). Besides, it was fairly stable during 
the crisis period, since the strong decline of interbank borrowing and fixed-term deposits was compensated by 
the growth of demand deposits from other professional money market participants. 
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stirred banks to expand their wholesale funding rapidly between 2003 and 2007. This trend was driven 
by the strong growth of secured wholesale transactions. The boom in asset prices in the run up to the 
crisis boosted financing that was collateralised by tradable securities, particularly repo transactions. 
During the crisis, this trend reversed dramatically. This illustrates the sensitivity of wholesale funding, 
repos in particular, for stress in financial markets. Secured wholesale funding declined strongly 
relatively to retail funding, also because banks increased reliance on retail deposits in their search for 
more stable sources of funding (ECB, 2009d). The issuance of securities fell somewhat back in 2008 
but has recovered since 2009, which partly reflects the increased securitisation of assets pledged as 
collateral at the central bank.  
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Adjustments to lending were concentrated in the wholesale loan portfolio (WSCR) of the banks. In 
terms of total assets it fell from around 35% mid-2007 to 25% in 2010 (Figure 3.2, panel B). Retail 
lending (RETCR) was more stable. It even increased in 2007 and 2008 and has decreased slightly since 
2009. 
 39 
Liquidity hoarding by Dutch banks was evident by the increased amount of deposits and 
collateral pledged at the central bank. This outpaced central bank borrowing and as a result net claims 
on the central bank increased (NCCB; Figure 3.2, panel C). The rising share of highly liquid bonds in 
the total bond portfolio also indicates that Dutch banks hoarded liquidity in the crisis. The share of 
liquid bonds doubled between 2007 and 2010 to nearly 10%. Holdings of less liquid bonds also 
increased between end-2008 and the beginning of 2010 (BONDI in panel D). This development partly 
relates to securitisation of loans. Since banks during the crisis were no longer able to place securitised 
assets in the market, they retained these (asset-backed) securities on their balance sheets for later use 
as collateral when borrowing from the central bank. 
Figure 3.2, panel D, shows the development of the bond and equity portfolios, adjusted for 
revaluations. The decline of equity and bond portfolios between mid-2007 and mid-2008 reflects an 





In this section four p-VAR models are estimated. The first three are designed to capture three types of 
bank asset reallocation after a shock in funding liquidity, i.e. (1) a cut in lending, (2) liquidity 
hoarding, and (3) fire-sales. As an encore, a fourth model is estimated designed to test a fourth 
hypothesis, i.e. whether fire sales are triggered by solvency constraints.  
Results are discussed for the sample of 17 banks and for the sub-sample of the 5 largest banks. 
However, we only display the results for the sub-sample of 5 banks if those are materially different 
from those of the full sample of 17 banks. 
 
3.4.1 Response of lending 
In the bank lending model, the variables in vectors X and Y of model (1) are:  
 
[  ] 'SPR REPO RETDEP WSCR RETCR
 
 
For bank lending we consider two main categories, wholesale lending (WSCR) and retail lending 
(RETCR). By also taking into account two main funding sources, secured wholesale borrowing 
(REPO) and retail deposits (RETDEP), we model credit management in relation to funding liquidity. 
With the inclusion of the money market spread (SPR), the model incorporates the price of bank 
funding, which also determines bank lending rates. Hence, the model captures both credit demand and 
credit supply effects. The price of funding is assumed to affect credit demand. When the interbank 
spread (SPR) rises, banks pass the increased funding costs on to their customers by raising lending 
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rates. As a consequence, the demand for credit may fall according to the traditional interest rate 
channel of monetary transmission.16 Credit supply effects are assumed to originate from changes in the 
available volume of wholesale funding, i.c. repo and securities funding. When banks are rationed on 
the funding market, they have less means to support their asset side activities. As a consequence they 
may curtail lending according to the liquidity channel of financial transmission. We allow retail 
deposits to be immediately affected by the stress in the wholesale funding market, while any feedback 
effect is assumed to occur only with a lag. The response variable of interest is bank lending, which is 
split into wholesale lending and retail lending, of which wholesale lending comes first. Robustness 
checks indicate that changes in the ordering of the variables have no substantial effect on the results. 
From the impulse responses (Figure 3.3) it appears that wholesale lending (WSCR) reacts 
significantly and positively to a shock in secured wholesale funding (REPO) and significantly and 
negatively to a shock in the money market spread (SPR). This applies both to the sample of 17 banks 
and the sub-sample of the 5 largest banks, and is in line with the experience in the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis that wholesale loans were most vulnerable to funding liquidity risk (ECB, 2010a). A sudden rise 
of interbank spreads and/or constraints in repo funding urge banks to adjust their asset side quickly, 
both in terms of size and in terms of risk. It is plausible, and evident from the data (Figure 3.2, panel 
B), that banks realise this adjustment by changing their wholesale lending rather than their retail 
lending, since in general the former has a shorter maturity and a higher risk profile than the latter. This 
outcome is consistent with the theoretical framework of Huang and Ratnovski (2010), who show that 
negative market signals are an incentive for wholesale financiers to withdraw from lending, especially 
short-term interbank lending. Liedorp et al. (2010) establish the channel of contagion running from 
wholesale funding to interbank lending empirically. 
                                               
16
 As a robustness check, we also try an alternative control variable for credit demand effects, i.e. real GDP 
growth (see Section 3.5). 
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The impulse responses show a significantly negative response of retail lending (RETCR) to a shock in 
wholesale lending (WSCR); see Figure 3.3, panel E. This suggests that, after a shock in the repo 
market, banks reduce the share of wholesale loans in their loan book in favour of (lower risk) retail 
loans. This substitution effect is weaker for the top-5 banks, which could reflect the fact that the 
largest banks have a more diversified asset side and therefore more flexibility to adjust their balance 
sheets. For both groups of banks, retail lending (RETCR) shows a brief but significantly positive 
response to a shock in retail deposits (RETDEP; Figure 3.3, panel D). This reflects the linkage 
between both retail items in the asset and liability management of banks. By matching retail lending 
with retail deposits, banks limit the retail funding gap and thereby their dependence on volatile 
wholesale markets for funding. Under volatile market conditions, banks shift their funding to more 
stable retail deposits, as is shown by the significant positive response of RETDEP to a shock in SPR 
(Figure 3.3, panel H). This response is only borderline significant for the top-5 banks, which again 
underlines that these banks have access to a wider range of non-retail funding possibilities than 
smaller banks. 
 
3.4.2 Liquidity hoarding 
The variables in the model for liquidity hoarding are:  
 
[   ] 'SPR REPO SECUR BONDL NCCB
 
 
Liquidity hoarding is captured by highly liquid bonds (BONDL) and net claims on the central bank 
(NCCB). Both can act as liquidity buffer in times of stress. By relating these two variables to both 
REPO and issued securities (SECUR) the link between liquidity hoarding and market dependent 
funding sources can be investigated. The variable SPR takes into account the influence of funding 
costs on the unsecured interbank market. The funding variables come first in the ordering of the p-
VAR. By implication of the ordering, the money market spread has an immediate effect on repo 
borrowing and the issuance of securities, while any feedback effects are assumed to occur only with a 
lag. The response variable of interest is liquidity holdings, which is split into highly liquid bonds and 
net claims on the central bank.  
The impulse responses (Figure 3.4) indicate that liquidity hoarding is evident in response to a 
shock in repo funding. For both samples of banks BONDL shows a (short) significant and negative 
reaction to a shock in secured borrowing (REPO; see Figure 3.4, panels B and H), indicating that a 
disruption in the secured funding market is followed by an accumulation of highly liquid assets. This 
is in accordance with the experience during the crisis, when at some point only high-quality collateral 
was accepted for repo transactions, which stimulated the hoarding of such assets. There is also 
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significant evidence of liquid bond hoarding in response to an upward shock in the money market 
spread (SPR) by the top-5 banks (Figure 3.4, panel G). We find no empirical evidence for feedback 
effects running from liquidity hoarding to the money market spread; the response of SPR to a shock in 
BONDL is not significant (result not shown in the figure). 
The sample of 17 banks also accumulates central bank reserves (NCCB) in response to a shock 
in the money market spread (SPR), see Figure 3.4, panel D. Hence, the price of funding liquidity 
appears to be an incentive for precautionary savings at the central bank. This is in line with the 
theoretical model of Gale and Yorulmazer (2011), according to which the price of liquidity is an 
incentive to hoard liquidity. For the top-5 banks, NCCB does not respond significantly to a shock in 
SPR (Figure 3.4, panel G). This could be related to the tiering of the interbank market during the crisis, 
as a result of which large banks in general paid lower spreads on unsecured interbank borrowing than 
small banks. Liquidity hoarding in the form of increasing claims on the central bank (NCCB) is also 
visible in response to a (negative) shock in secured funding (REPO) for the sample of 17 bank; see 
Figure 3.4, panel E. 
The 5 largest banks also seem to be less dependent on the central bank in case of a shock to 
repo funding; the impulse response in panel K of Figure 3.4 is not significant. This is not in 
accordance with the liquidity hoarding hypothesis, which assumes a negative response of NCCB to a 
shock in REPO (e.g. a decline in repo funding urges banks to hoard central bank reserves, as is the 
case for the whole sample of banks, see panel E). However, it should be noted that the variable NCCB 
is the difference between central bank deposits and borrowings, which implies that a change in NCCB 
could also reflect a change in central bank borrowing. This could explain the positive response of 
NCCB to SECUR (which is borderline significant for the top-5 banks, see panel L), since a shut-down 
of the primary market for securities issuance may stimulate banks to step up their borrowing from the 
central bank (lowering NCCB) by using asset-backed securities as collateral in refinancing operations. 
During the crisis, such securities were partly created for the purpose of collateralised borrowing at the 





We note that the results on liquidity hoarding are relatively sensitive to the ordering of the variables, 
especially with respect to the responses of NCCB to a shock in SPR. 
 
3.4.3 Fire sales 
The variables in the model for fire sales are:  
 
[   ] 'SPR REPO SECUR BONDI EQ
 
 
The first three variables are identical to the ones in the liquidity hoarding model specification. The 
response variable of interest is securities holdings, which is split into less liquid bonds (BONDI) and 
equity investments (EQ). We include BONDI instead of BONDL (which we used in the liquidity 
hoarding model), assuming that under stressful market conditions banks prefer to sell their least liquid 
bonds (BONDI) first, while holding on to their highly liquid bonds (BONDL) for precautionary 
reasons. 
The impulse responses in Figure 3.5 do not show a significant response of investment 
portfolios to shocks in securities issued (SECUR; Figure 3.5, panels B and D), but the significant 
positive response of equity holdings to a shock in secured wholesale funding (REPO; panel C) is 
consistent with the occurrence of fire sales (this result is robust to changing the ordering of the 
variables in the VAR, while the sample of the 5 largest banks shows a similar impulse response). The 
positive relation between equity holdings and secured funding could also reflect the use of equities in 
repos and securities lending transactions. When these activities are buoyant, banks equity holdings are 
useful as collateral, while these become less useful when the secured funding market collapses and 
only high-quality bonds are accepted as collateral. The significant negative response of EQ to an 
upward shock in the money market spread (SPR) confirms the risk of fire sales after a shock in 
wholesale funding (panel F). This finding is in line with the results of Nyborg and Östberg (2010), that 
tightness in the interbank market for liquidity leads banks to pull-back liquidity, by selling equity 
portfolios, among other things. They conclude that this could be either due to direct sales of equity 
holdings by banks or to sales by other stock market investors that are confronted by a reduced liquidity 






Surprisingly, there is a negative response of less liquid bond holdings (BONDI) to a shock in secured 
wholesale funding (Figure 3.5; panel A), while there is no significant ‘fire sales effect’ for bonds in 
response to a shock in the funding spread (panel E). The same result - not shown in the figure - is 
found when less liquid bonds (BONDI) are replaced by highly liquid bonds (BONDL), suggesting that 
banks do not distinguish between liquid and illiquid bonds when they adjust their bond portfolio in 
response to a funding shock. Apparently, the liquidity hoarding motive (i.e. an increase of liquid bond 
holdings after a negative funding shock, cf. Section 3.4.2) dominates the fire sale motive with regard 
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to bond portfolios. A reason for this dominance could be the additional liquidity supplied by the 
central bank during the crisis, which enabled banks to obtain funding against liquid and less liquid 
bonds as collateral. By these liquidity operations, central banks aimed to prevent costly fire sales of 
assets in financial markets by banks with a strong reliance on wholesale funding (ECB, 2010a). 
As pointed out in Section 3.1, theoretical models (e.g. Cifuentes et al., 2005) and simulation 
models (e.g. Aikman et al., 2009) are not clear about the issue whether liquidity or capital constraints 
are the main trigger for fire sales. Therefore, we also estimate a fourth model that relates securities 
holdings to both bank capital and the money market spread: 
 
[   1 ] 'SPR TIER BONDI EQ
 
 
Variable TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1-capital to risk-weighted assets. If solvency constraints trigger fire 
sales of assets, there should be a significantly positive response of BONDI and EQ to a shock in TIER1 
(meaning that a deteriorating solvency position urges a bank to offload its investment holdings and 
vice versa). Figure 3.6 shows that such a relationship is not evident, neither for bonds nor for equity, 
while the impulse response of EQ is negative and significant with regard to a shock in the money 
market spread. A similar result is found for the sample of the 5 largest banks. From this we conclude 






Summing up, we find that in times of stress on the wholesale funding markets, banks reduce lending, 
particularly wholesale lending, hoard liquidity in the form of liquid bonds and sell off part of their 
investment portfolio, especially equity. We also find that fire sales are more likely to be triggered by 





In this section we present some robustness tests.17 First, we re-estimate the models for the 12 smaller 
banks from our sample of 17 banks, i.e. excluding the 5 largest banks. Concerning the lending model 
the only notable difference is that retail credit does not significantly respond to shocks in SPR and 
REPO, which suggests that credit supply by the smaller banks is less sensitive to developments in 
wholesale funding markets. The impulse responses for the liquidity hoarding model are in line with the 
findings for the whole sample. The response of central bank reserves (NCCB) to repo funding (REPO) 
and funding cost (SPR) shocks is even stronger for the 12 banks than for the whole sample, suggesting 
that the smaller banks are more dependent on the central bank for liquidity. With regard to the fire 
sales model, the response of equity holdings (EQ) to a shock in the money market spread (SPR) and 
secured wholesale funding (REPO) is not found to be significant for the smaller banks (compared to 
the significant response for the whole sample of banks). One explanation for this difference could be 
that the smaller banks in the Netherlands hold less equity in their trading books and more equity in the 
form of participations that can be sold less easily. A shock to the capital ratio has no significant effect 
on equity or bond holdings, similar to the result for the whole sample of banks. 
Second, we re-estimate the models for a sub-period representing the financial crisis (June 2007 
to the last month in the dataset, April 2010). The impulse responses for the lending model show some 
notable differences. The response of wholesale lending (WSCR) to a shock in the money market spread 
(SPR) and secured wholesale funding (REPO) is stronger for the crisis period. This can be explained 
by the strong adverse shocks to the wholesale funding market during the crisis. At the peak of the 
crisis in September/October 2008, the money market rate increased by more than 2 standard deviations 
in one month, while repo funding of Dutch banks dropped by almost 1 standard deviation on average 
for two months in a row. For comparison: all impulse response functions show a 1 standard deviation 
shock during one single month. The results of the liquidity hoarding and fire sales models are almost 
similar for both sample periods. 
Third, we test the robustness of the model results for bank lending for the choice of the control 
variable with respect to credit demand effects. Specifically, we replace the interest rate spread (SPR), 
                                               
17
 For reasons of space, the results are not presented in figures or tables, and are available on request. 
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which is included in the original model specification in Section 3.4.1, by real GDP growth (quarter-on-
quarter change). Economic growth can be considered to be another driver of credit demand, alternative 
to the interest rate spread (SPR). The impulse responses indicate that a shock in GDP growth has no 
significant effects on either retail or wholesale lending, in contrast to the significant effects of a shock 
in SPR to lending (see Section 3.4.1). However, controlling for credit demand by GDP growth instead 
of SPR does not materially change the impulse responses of retail and wholesale lending to a shock in 
repo funding or retail deposits (which we interpreted as credit supply effects in Section 3.2). This 
suggests that the credit supply effects are robust to different variables that control for credit demand. 
Fourth, we introduce a variable to the VAR specifications to test the influence of the default 
risk of the banks. This risk is reflected in the credit default swap spread (CDS, see Figure 3.7)18 which 
replaces the money market spread variable (SPR) in the model specifications. In all models, CDS is 
included as the first variable, assuming that market prices are more exogenous to banks than their own 
balance sheets. In general, the results are similar to those of the original model specifications including 
SPR. A notable difference in the model for bank lending is that the response of wholesale credit to a 
shock in CDS is not significant for the whole sample of banks, while it is significantly negative if SPR 
is included instead of CDS (see Section 3.4.1). This suggests that wholesale lending is to a larger 
extent driven by liquidity risk than by banks’ default risk. A similar conclusion can be drawn with 
regard to the response of equity holdings in the fire sales model, which is significant for a shock in 
SPR (see Section 3.4.3), but not significant for a shock in CDS (this difference is specifically due to 
the largest 5 banks). This is in line with the result found in Section 3.4.3 that liquidity constraints 
rather than solvency constraints seem to trigger sales of equity holdings. A difference in the liquidity 
hoarding model is that the response of net central bank reserves (NCCB) to a shock in secured 
wholesale borrowing (REPO) is no longer significant. There is a significantly positive response of 
NCCB to CDS, though, suggesting that stress in financial markets (reflected in a higher CDS) goes in 
tandem with increased demand for central bank reserves (reflected in an increase of NCCB). 
 
 
                                               
18
 For the 12 smaller banks CDS spreads are not available. Therefore, for those banks we use the average CDS 
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Figure 3.7. Credit default swap spreads Dutch banks







This chapter provides empirical evidence on banks’ responses to funding liquidity shocks, using data 
of seventeen of the largest Dutch banks over the period January 2004 to April 2010. The dynamic 
interrelations among instruments of bank liquidity management are modelled in a panel Vector 
Autoregressive (p-VAR) framework. Orthogonalized impulse responses reveal that banks respond to a 
negative funding liquidity shock in a number of ways. First, banks reduce lending, especially 
wholesale lending. Wholesale loans are most vulnerable to funding liquidity risk and banks adjust 
their wholesale lending rather than their retail lending. Second, banks hoard liquidity, in the form of 
liquid bonds and central bank reserves. A disruption of the secured funding market is followed by an 
accumulation of highly liquid assets and the price of funding liquidity appears to be an incentive for 
precautionary savings at the central bank. Third, banks conduct fire sales of securities, especially 
equity. With regard to bond holdings, the liquidity hoarding motive seems to dominate the fire sale 
motive when the central bank supplies additional liquidity during the crisis, enabling banks to obtain 
funding against bonds as collateral. We also find that fire sales are triggered by liquidity constraints 
rather than by solvency constraints. 
These results have two important policy implications. First, the results suggest that extended 
liquidity operations by the central bank can effectively complement the market when it fails to 
function in a crisis. Central bank deposits provide banks with a precautionary liquidity buffer, while 
the additional liquidity supply of the central bank enable banks to obtain funding against collateral (of 
less liquid bonds such as asset-back securities) that is otherwise not eligible for private repo 
transactions. By doing this, the central bank can prevent costly fire sales by banks with too much 
reliance on wholesale funding. This underlines that a flexible collateral framework of central banks, 
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which can be broadened in times of stress, is an important safeguard against banks’ responses that 
destabilise financial markets. Second, the results support the proposal by the Basel Committee to 
enhance the quantity and quality of liquidity buffers of banks and to reduce their maturity mismatches 
(BCBS, 2010c). Our results show that shocks to wholesale funding can induce major adjustments of 
banks’ balance sheets that can be costly for the economy and destabilise financial markets. It may be 
assumed that banks with more and higher-quality liquid buffers respond less strongly to shocks in 
financial markets. Our results particularly support the requirement of the Basel Committee to increase 




Variable names and definitions 
Name Definition 
Assets 1  
NCCB Net claims on central bank (deposits minus borrowing) 
BONDL Liquid bond holdings (Tier 1 assets according to previous ECB list) 
BONDI Less liquid bond holdings (non-Tier 1 assets according to previous ECB list) 
EQ Equity portfolio 
RETCR Retail credit (households and companies) 
WSCR Wholesale credit (secured and unsecured, professional counterparties) 
  
Liabilities 1  
SECUR Securities issued (bonds, CPs, CDs, etc.) 
REPO Secured wholesale borrowing (repos and securities borrowing) 
RETDEP Retail deposits (households and smaller companies) 
  
Capital  





SPR Money market spread (Euribor 3 month rate minus EONIA swap index), in basis 
points 
CDS Credit default swap spread, in basis points 
1 Ratios to total assets. 
 
     
